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ABSTRACT
Protocols for securely testing the equality of two encrypted in-
tegers are common building blocks for a number of proposals in
the literature that aim for privacy preservation. Being used repeat-
edly in many cryptographic protocols, designing efficient equality
testing protocols is important in terms of computation and commu-
nication overhead. In this work, we consider a scenario with two
parties where party A has two integers encrypted using an addi-
tively homomorphic scheme and party B has the decryption key.
Party A would like to obtain an encrypted bit that shows whether
the integers are equal or not but nothing more. We propose three
secure equality testing protocols, which are more efficient in terms
of communication, computation or both compared to the exist-
ing work. To support our claims, we present experimental results,
which show that our protocols achieve up to 99% computation-wise
improvement compared to the state-of-the-art protocols in a fair
experimental set-up.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation→ Cryptographic protocols;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Processing encrypted data has been addressed in several fields, e.g.
biometric data matching [26], recommender systems [15], data min-
ing [32] and data aggregation [19], as it enables collaborating with
an untrustworthy service provider to process privacy-sensitive data.
The main idea is to provide only the encrypted version of the data to
the service provider and invoke interactive cryptographic protocols
with the decryption key owner to perform the desired algorithm.
While being very secure regarding protecting the privacy-sensitive
data without hampering the service, processing encrypted data
introduces a significant amount of computational and communi-
cation overhead compared to performing the same algorithm with
unencrypted data. In the literature, it is suggested to design custom-
tailored cryptographic protocols, rather than applying generic so-
lutions, to improve the efficiency of the privacy-preserving version
of the algorithm. Building blocks with encrypted data for those
algorithms like comparison, division, and equality checks [21] need
to be designed with high efficiency. The main reason is that these
core operations are repeated in large quantities in conventional
data processing algorithms. For example, finding similar users in a
system with millions of users to a particular one based on his or her
taste for movies [15] requires comparison of similarity scores linear
in the number of users in the system. Testing the equality of two
encrypted integers is one of the widely-used operations, e.g. for
searching in encrypted databases. Other applications for equality
testing protocols also include, but are not limited to, secure pattern
matching [13], secure linear algebra [7], and encryption switching
protocols [4].
Yang et al. [31] introduced the first public key encryption that
supports testing equality (PKwET). Their work allows checking
whether two ciphertexts encrypted under the same or different keys
are encryptions of the same value. Tong[28] introduced a protocol
to enable equality testing for authorized users. Later works tried
to improve the performance or functionality of PKwET [14, 18, 30].
However, existing PKwET proposals leak the result of the equality
test to the service provider, which is usually a semi-trusted remote
computation server.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is another approach to
design algorithms for secure equality checking. In such protocols,
two or more parties jointly compute an agreed function of their
secret inputs. Many works have been introduced to show that any
function can be computed securely using MPC [3, 5, 6]. Nishide and
Ohta proposed a probabilistic constant-round equality test protocol
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[23], where the Jacobi symbol is used to test quadratic residuosity
of a value. Although the proposed protocol, (NO07), is efficient
regarding computation, the result of the protocol is probabilistic:
with a probability of 50%, the protocol returns a correct answer.
The protocol is suggested to be executed φ times to minimize the
error probability to 2−φ . As it is necessary to pick large values for φ
to reduce the false positive rate, the protocol becomes computation
and communication wise demanding.
Schoenmakers and Tuyls [27] has presented a method (ST06) to
check the equality of two encrypted integers by using a protocol
based on bit-decomposition. However, this protocol is expensive
regarding the number of communication rounds. In [21], Lipmaa
and Toft have introduced an equality test protocol (LT13) on top of
an arithmetic black box [11]. The protocol uses Lagrange interpola-
tion similar to [8]. A multiplicative masking is used in [8], a similar
idea from [1], since its realization is easier than additive masking.
However, multiplicative masking is not computationally efficient
in a two-party setting because the size of the exponent can be very
large. However, it is important to note that LT13 is more efficient
when there are more than two parties in the setting. The works
[27] and [21] are both secure against active adversaries.
There are also efficient secure equality testing protocols based
on Garbled circuits (GC) [16, 17]. In [17], Kolesnikov et al. propose
an efficient construction that enables XOR to be evaluated for free.
Then, in [16], evaluation of MPC protocols (VAT09) using free XOR
technique has improved the computational efficiency of garbled
circuits up to 50%. However, computational efficiency was achieved
at the cost of significant communication and pre-computation over-
head. Moreover, using GC results in additional computation and
communication overhead for converting encryptions to garbled
circuit inputs as explained in [16].
In this paper, our aim is to check whether two encrypted values
under an additively homomorphic encryption scheme such as Pail-
lier [24] are equal or not. More precisely, party A has the encryption
of two ℓ-bit integers, [a] and [b], where [·] denotes the encryption,
and party B has the decryption key. Neither party is allowed to
learn the outcome bit ϑ . The bit ϑ is one, exactly when a = b, and
zero otherwise, similar to the other existing works [21, 23, 27]. We
assume 0 ≤ a,b < 2ℓ .
We propose three secure equality testing protocols, namely EQT-
1, EQT-2 and EQT-3. As it is shown in Figure 1, there is a trade-off
between computation and communication cost. For the sake of
clarity, we present a summary of our protocols:
• EQT-1 is based on a coin toss where the results determines
either performing a secure Hamming distance computation
for the two inputs or invoking a secure joint function [10].
The resulting protocol has the least communication overhead
among all other proposals. While it is computationally more
expensive than our other two proposal, it is computationally
97% more efficient than the state-of-the-art and requires 24%
less communication overhead.
• EQT-2 relies on computing the Hamming distance and the
secure comparison protocol [22]. The protocol has a bal-
anced computational and communication overhead. EQT-2
is computationally 38% more efficient than EQT-1 with 25%
more communication overhead.
Time (ms)
Communication 
(KB)
Figure 1: A summary of secure equality testing protocols’
performance for 20-bit inputs. Dashed bar denotes that the
value is very large and does not fit in the graph.
• EQT-3 is using Lagrange interpolation that has the best over-
all computational performance and 99% more efficient than
the state-of-the-art. EQT-3 is computation-wise over 30%
more efficient than EQT-2, but it has 43% more communica-
tion overhead compared to EQT-2.
2 PRELIMINARIES
The symbols and their description are listed in Table 1.
2.1 Security Setting
We consider the semi-honest security model [12], where both par-
ties are assumed to be honest in following the protocol description,
while they are curious to obtain more information than they are
entitled to. In this setting, it is assumed that A and B do not collude.
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
We use two additively homomorphic and semantically secure en-
cryption schemes, namely Paillier [25] and DGK [10]. In an addi-
tively homomorphic encryption scheme, multiplying two cipher-
texts Epk (m1) and Epk (m2) results in a ciphertext, whose decryp-
tion is the sumof two plaintextsm1 andm2:Dsk (Epk (m1)·Epk (m2)) =
(m1 +m2) mod n, where n is the encryption system modulus. Con-
sequently, exponentiation of any ciphertext with a public integer
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Table 1: List of symbols
Symbol Description Symbol Description
a,b input messages δ comparison result
ℓ input bit size n crypto modulus
⊕ exclusive or κ security parameter
r ,ρ,s,w randoms φ error controller [23]
[.] Paillier cipher J.K DGK cipher
A,B stack holders xi i th bit of integer x
Zu DGK plaintext
space
d (a,b) Hamming distance of
a and b
p,q,vp ,vq primes t DGK parameter
ϑ equality result sk private key
pk public key Epk encryption
Dsk decryption log ℓ ⌈log2 ℓ⌉
value k yields the encrypted product of the original plaintext and
the public value: Dsk (Epk (m)k ) = (k ·m) mod n.
Paillier. The Paillier encryption [25] for a given messagem ∈ Zn
is defined as Epk (m,r ) = дm · rn mod n2, where n is the product
of two distinct large prime numbers p and q, ciphertext Epk (m,r ) ∈
Z∗n2 , r is a random number from Z
∗
n , and д is a generator of Z∗n . The
public key is (д,n), and the private key is (p,q). This encryption
scheme is additively homomorphic. The security of Paillier is based
on hardness of computing nth residue classes. For the decryption
operation, we refer readers to [25].
DGK. The DGK cryptosystem [10] is used in this work for two
reasons: 1) it is more efficiency than Paillier in term of computation
and communication since it has much smaller ciphertext size, 2)
it enables checking whether a ciphertext is an encryption of zero
without performing the expensive decryption operation, which can
save computation. Note that DGK decryption is very expensive for
large inputs since it uses a look-up table.
The process of generating the keys is as follows: 1) choose two
distinct t-bit prime numbersvp , vq , 2) construct two distinct prime
numbers p and q, where vp |(p − 1) and vq |(q − 1) such that n = pq
is a k-bit RSA modulus, 3) choose u, the smallest possible prime
number but greater than ℓ + 2, 4) choose a random r that is a 2.5t-
bit integer, and 5) choose д and h such that ord(д) = uvpvq and
ord(h) = vpvq , where ℓ < t < k . The public and the private keys
are pk = (n,д,h,u) and sk = (p,q,vp ,vq ), respectively.
In the rest of the paper, we denote the ciphertext of a messagem
by [m] for the Paillier cryptosystem and JmK for the DGK. We also
omit the modular reductions, when describing the computational
steps, for simplicity.
3 OUR PROTOCOLS
3.1 Equality Testing Protocol (EQT)-1
In this protocol, described in Protocol 1, we use the idea that com-
putes either the Hamming distance between two encryptions or
performs a secure comparison based on the idea from the DGK
comparison protocol [10], after a coin toss. The reason for this
coin toss is as follows: calculating the Hamming distance is less
expensive regarding computation and communication overhead.
However, only using Hamming distance for equality check leaks
information. Assume that only the Hamming distance is used for
testing the equality of a and b. Then, party B learns whether a = b
after performing the DGK zero-check, since the Hamming distance
is always zero, precisely when a = b. Party B acquiring this infor-
mation is not desired since we do not want Party A and B to learn
any information. Therefore, we toss a coin and we either compute
the Hamming distance or perform secure comparison, hiding what
is being computed from Party B.
Protocol 1 EQT-1
1: Party A generates a sufficiently large (ℓ + 1 + κ bits) random
value r , computes [x] ← [a − b + r ], and sends [x] to B.
2: Party B decrypts [x], computes the first ℓ bits xi , 0 ≤ i < ℓ,
encrypts them separately with DGK (for efficiency reason), and
sends JxiK to A.
3: Party A computes Jri ⊕ xiK for 0 ≤ i < ℓ, by distinguishing
ri = 0 and ri = 1. If ri = 0, Jri ⊕ xiK ← JxiK, else, Jri ⊕ xiK ←J1K · JxiK−1.
4: Party A tosses a random coin δA ∈ {0,1}.
5: if δA = 0 then
6: Party A computes Jc0K ← ∏ℓ−1i=0 Jri ⊕ xiK, and multiplica-
tively blinds it with a large (in case of DGK, the random
number ρ should contain 2t bits) random number ρ.
7: Party A generates ℓ − 1 non-zero random integers ci , 1 ≤
i < ℓ, and encrypts them.
8: else
9: Party A computes JciK ← J−1K ·Jri ⊕xiK · (∏ℓ−1j=i+1Jr j ⊕x jK)2,
for 0 ≤ i < ℓ.
10: Party A generates ℓ large (in case of DGK, the random
numbers ρi should be 2t bits) non-zero random numbers
ρi , 0 ≤ i < ℓ, and uses them to multiplicatively blind ci :JciK ← JciKρ i .
11: end if
12: Party A randomly permutes the order of the JciK, 0 ≤ i < ℓ,
and sends them to party B.
13: Party B decrypts (in case of DGK, a DGK zero-check is suffi-
cient) the numbers JciK to find whether one of them is 0. If (at
least) one of them is 0, party B sets δB ← 1, otherwise δB ← 0.
14: Party B encrypts δB , and sends it to A.
15: Party A computes [ϑ ], by distinguishing δA = 0 and δA = 1. If
δA = 0, [ϑ ] ← [δB], else, [ϑ ] ← [1] · [δB]−1.
Correctness. Since 0 ≤ a,b < 2ℓ , we have r −2ℓ < x = a−b+r <
r + 2ℓ , so it is sufficient to check whether the first (least significant)
ℓ bits of x and r are equal. We know∑ℓ−1i=0 ri ⊕xi ≥ 0, with equality
precisely when a = b. In case δA = 0, we have c0 =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 ri ⊕ xi ,
so the (blinded) numbers ci , 0 ≤ i < ℓ will have exactly one zero,
precisely when a = b, and will all be non-zero, otherwise. Therefore,
if δB = 1, we have δA⊕δB = 1 = (a = b). The case δB = 0 is similar.
If δA = 1, party A computes ci = −1 + ri ⊕ xi + 2∑ℓ−1j=i+1 r j ⊕ x j . If
all ri ⊕ xi = 0, then all ci = −1, and δB = 0. Otherwise, precisely
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one of the ci will be zero [9], and δB = 1. Therefore, in both cases
(a = b) ← δA ⊕ δB .
Optimization. Although the decryption of [x] and the multiplica-
tive blindings dominate the computational complexity, the number
of multiplications for computing the JciK can be reduced further.
Instead of computing ci ← −1 + ri ⊕ xi + 2∑ℓ−1j=i+1 r j ⊕ x j , we
can use the optimization introduced in [22]. Parties can compute
ci ← −1 + ri + xi + ∑ℓ−1j=i+1 2j (r j − x j ) = (−1 + ri + ∑ℓ−1j=i+1 2jr j ) +
(xi −∑ℓ−1j=i+1 2jx j ) = cAi +cBi , where cAi can be computed in clear by
party A, and cBi by party B. Then, for each i , 0 ≤ i < ℓ, it requires
only one multiplication to compute JciK ← JcAi K · JcBi K, which party
A has to perform in case δA = 1. These modified ci ’s retain the
property that precisely one of them is zero, if and only if, a , b.
In case δA = 0, party A can use the same JcB0 K to compute
an encryption of c0 ← (−r0 + ∑ℓ−1j=1 2jr j ) + cB0 instead of c0 ←∑ℓ−1
i=0 ri ⊕ xi , which requires computing cA0 ← −r0 +
∑ℓ−1
j=1 2
jr j in
clear. Also for this c0, we have c0 = 0, if and only if a = b. This
optimization avoids computing Jri ⊕ xiK by party A, and reduces
the computation of each JciK to one multiplication.
3.2 Equality Testing Protocol (EQT)-2
Our proposal also uses the Hamming distance of a and b, which is
d (a,b) ← ∑ℓ−1i=0 ai⊕bi , to determineϑ . As described in Protocol 2, it
works as follows: (1) party A computes [x], (2) party A computes the
encrypted Hamming distance between x mod 2ℓ and r mod 2ℓ , and
(3) party A and B use a secure comparison protocol to compute the
encryption of (d > 0) . If d > 0, then a , b, and a = b, otherwise.
Note that there is a fundamental difference with EQT-1, which
also computes Hamming distance: EQT-2 computes the Hamming
distance of the two encrypted inputs, invokes a secure comparison
protocol, namely EPPCP from [22], which returns an encrypted
result. Therefore, there is no information revealed to Party B. The
choice of using EPPCP is based on its high performance. The DGK
comparison protocol is not preferred as the message space too large
to create a look-up table.
Protocol 2 EQT-2
1: Party A generates a sufficiently large (κ + ℓ + 1 bits) random
value r , computes [x] ← [a − b + r ], and sends [x] to B.
2: Party B decrypts [x], computes the first ℓ bits xi , 0 ≤ i < ℓ,
and their sum X ← ∑ℓ−1i=0 xi , encrypts them all separately, and
sends them to A.
3: Party A computes [d] ← [∑ℓ−1i=0 ri ⊕ xi ] = [∑ℓ−1i=0 ri ] · [X ] ·
(
∏ℓ−1
i=0,r i=1[xi ])
−2.
4: Two parties jointly run the comparison protocol (EPPCP) [22],
where party A receives [1] if [0 < d], [0] otherwise, while
both parties learn nothing about the inputs and the relation
between [d] and [0]. The ones’ complement of the result of
EPPCP is simply the result of the equality test, [ϑ ] ← [1] −
EPPCP ([0],[d]).
Correctness. Since x − r = a − b, and 0 ≤ a,b < 2ℓ , then a = b
if d = d (x mod 2ℓ,r mod 2ℓ ) = 0. To check if a = b, party A and
party B jointly run EPPCP, where EPPCP returns (encrypted) zero
when a = b, and (encrypted) one when a , b.
Optimization. In EQT-2, we first securely compute d ← d (a,b),
0 ≤ d ≤ ℓ, and afterward securely compute δ ← (d > 0). The
complexity of EPPCP depends on the size of its inputs. To reduce
this size, we can add an additional communication round to securely
compute d´ ← d (d ,0), 0 ≤ d´ < log2 ℓ, and securely compare d´ with
0. This way of reducing the input size can be repeated many times,
which reduces the computation effort at the cost of increasing the
number of communication rounds.
3.3 Equality Testing Protocol (EQT)-3
Previously presented protocols rely on secure comparison or effi-
cient zero-check of the DGK encryption scheme. Unlike the other
two protocols, EQT-3, described in Protocol 3, is a protocol that
does not require zero-checking or secure comparison. The main
idea of EQT-3 is to first compute the Hamming distance e between
x mod 2ℓ and r mod 2ℓ similar to the other protocols. Note that
0 ≤ e ≤ ℓ, where ℓ is the bit-length of the inputs a and b. To make
the range of e smaller (later we show that the smaller range of e
results in a significant more efficient protocol), we mask [e] with
a large number numberw , [y] ← [e +w]. Afterward, we compute
the Hamming distance d between y mod 2log2 ℓ andw mod 2log2 ℓ ,
where 0 ≤ d ≤ log2 ℓ . Finally, we generate and compute a polyno-
mial that maps d = 0 to 1, and d ∈ {1,2, . . . , log2 ℓ} to 0.
Protocol 3 EQT-3
1: Party A generates a sufficiently large (ℓ + 1 + κ bits) random
value r , computes [x] = [a − b + r ], and sends [x] to B.
2: Party B decrypts [x], computes the first ℓ bits xi , 0 ≤ i < ℓ, and
their sum X = ∑ℓ−1i=0 xi , encrypts them separately, and sends
them to A.
3: Party A computes the first ℓ bits of r to derive [e] = [∑ℓ−1i=0 ri ⊕
xi ] = [
∑ℓ−1
i=0 ri ] · [X ] · (
∏ℓ−1
i=0,r i=1[xi ])
−2.
4: Party A generates a sufficiently large (log2 ℓ + κ bits) random
valuew , computes [y = e +w], and sends [y] to B.
5: Party B decrypts [y], computes the first log2 ℓ bits yi , 0 ≤
i < log2 ℓ, and their sum Y =
∑(log2 ℓ)−1
i=0 yi , encrypts them
separately, and sends them to A.
6: Party A computes the first log2 ℓ bits of w to derive
[d] = [∑(log2 ℓ)−1i=0 wi ⊕ yi ] = [∑(log2 ℓ)−1i=0 wi ] · [Y ] ·
(
∏(log2 ℓ)−1
i=0,w i=1 [yi ])
−2.
7: Party A generates a sufficiently large (log2 log2 ℓ + κ bits) ran-
dom value s , computes [z = d + s], and sends [z] to B.
8: Party B decrypts [z], computes λ = z mod ϱ, where ϱ =
(log2 ℓ) + 1, and from that the integers γi , 0 ≤ i < (2 log2 ℓ) + 1,
as specified bellow. Party B encrypts the γi , and sends them to
A.
9: Party A computes σ = s mod ϱ, and [ϑ ] = [f (σ − λ)] =
[∑2 log2 ℓi=0 γiσ i ] = (. . . ([γ2 log2 ℓ]σ · [γ(2 log2 ℓ)−1])σ . . . · [γ1])σ ·
[γ0].
The polynomial f , which is specified below, can be computed
beforehand in the clear. Each integer γi can be computed by only
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one multiplicative inverse and one multiplication. The exponentia-
tion to the power −2 in step 3 is implemented by one multiplicative
inverse, and one square.
Computation of γi . As shown before, x = a − b + r , e = d (x ,r ),
y = e + w , d = d (y,w ), z = d + s , and finally ϑ = (z = s ), where
0 ≤ d ≤ log ℓ. The idea is to compute the Lagrange polynomial f (x )
such that it maps 0 to 1, and maps x to 0, where 0 < |x | ≤ log2 ℓ.
Then, we can compute δ = f (s mod ϱ − z mod ϱ) = f (σ − λ).
The Lagrange polynomial f is easily found as f (x ) =∏log ℓ
i=− log2 ℓ,i,0
x−i
−i = (−1)log ℓ (log ℓ!)−2
∏log ℓ
i=− log ℓ,i,0 (x − i ) =
(−1)log ℓ (log ℓ!)−2 ∑2 log ℓi=0 fix i , where fi ∈ Z can be derived.
The binomial expansion of x i = (σ − λ)i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 log ℓ,
gives ∑ij=0 (ij)σ j (−λ)i− j . Therefore, we can write
f (σ − λ) = (−1)log ℓ (log ℓ!)−2
2 log ℓ∑
i=0
fi
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
σ j (−λ)i− j ,
which reduces to∑2 log ℓj=0 γ jσ j , whereγ j = (−1)log ℓ (log ℓ!)−2 ∑2 log ℓi=j
fi
(i
j
)
(−λ)i− j and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 log ℓ. In order to compute the γ j , party
B computes the multiplicative inverse of (log ℓ!)2 modulo n, and
multiplies this with the integer ∑2 log ℓi=j fi (ij) (−λ)i− j .
Correctness. In EQT-3, the Hamming distance e between x mod
2ℓ and r mod 2ℓ is computed. For efficiency purpose (we will dis-
cuss this later), then, the second Hamming distance d between the
first log ℓ low significant bits of e + w and w is computed. After-
ward, party B computes encrypted γi values, which are required
from party A to compute a polynomial that outputs the equal-
ity testing result. Actually, a Lagrange polynomial f (σ − λ) =∏log ℓ
i=− log ℓ,i,0
(σ −λ)−i
−i is generated in this equality testing proto-
col, where it maps (σ − λ = 0) to 1 and other values to 0. Recall
that σ = s mod ϱ, λ = z mod ϱ, and z = d + s ; therefore, if and only
if d = 0, then f (σ − λ) outputs 1.
Optimisation. Similar to ETQ-3, adding one more round reduces
the communicational and computational costs. Besides that, it is
also possible to lessen the number of rounds in EQT-3 if there is a
limit in a particular application setting. However, decreasing one
round makes the polynomial more complicated and the protocol
more expensive.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide proofs to show that our three secure
equality testing protocols are simulation secure in the semi-honest
security model. Informally, we mean that the probability that an
adversary can learn private information from truly generated data
by the parties in our protocols is at most negligibly more than
the probability that an adversary can learn from given randomly
generated data. We use the simulatability paradigm [20] in our
proofs, where the adversary takes the control of the network and
try to obtain the final result of the protocol by itself as the only
party in the protocol. In this paradigm, security is defined as a
comparison of computation work-flow in “real world" and “ideal
world".
In real world, a protocol can be broken into sub-protocols or
computations that are carried out by each party throughout the
protocol. Let us denote π as one of EQT protocols; we can split π
into two parts: π = πA and πB , which are performed in parties A
and B, respectively. πA takes [a] and [b], which are the inputs, and
outputs [ϑ ], [ϑ ] ← πA([a],[b];ϕ). And πB decrypts the given en-
cryptions from party A, processes them, and sends their encrypted
versions to party B. Thus, to perform secure equality testing the
encrypted messages flow from one party to another party and to-
gether they generate the [ϑ ] as the result of EQT. Assuming party
A is corrupted by an adversary A, then A has access to [a], [b],
and [ϑ ]. Similarly, when party B is corrupted, the adversary has
access to the intermediate computation results.
In an ideal world, it is assumed that one of the parties is corrupted
by an adversary. Then, he uses a simulator to generate the outputs
of the other party. This would be similar to performing EQT with
just one party, which is corrupted. In the ideal world, an adversary
A´, who has control over party A, has only access to her inputs [a],
[b], and the garbage inputs given from simulated party B instead of
the correct result of πB . The goal is to show thatA can learn equal
or negligibly more than A´, meaning that they are computationally
indistinguishable, then we can claim that EQT is a simulation secure
protocol.
Definition 4.1. Let a ∈ {0,1}∗ represents the parties’ inputs,
n ∈ N to be a security parameter, and X = {X (a,n)}a∈{0,1}∗;n∈N
and Y = {Y (a,n)}a∈{0,1}∗;n∈N, two infinite sequences of random
variables, are probability ensembles. Then, X and Y are computa-
tionally indistinguishable, denoted asX c≡ Y , if there is a polynomial
p (.) for every non-uniform polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm
(nuPPT) D such that:
|Pr [D (X (a,n)) = 1] − Pr [D (Y (a,n)) = 1]| < 1/p (n) (1)
4.1 Security of EQT-1
Let denote the computation of [ci ] as Af1 , δB as Bf1 , and [ϑ ] as Af2
in EQT-1. Let f = (Af ,Bf ), where Af = (Af1 ,Af2 ) and Bf = (Bf1 ),
the f to be the PPT functionality for EQT-1. The view of the i th
party, i ∈ {A,B}, during the execution of EQT-1 on ([a],[b];ϕ)
and security parameter n is denoted by viewEQT −1i ([a], [b];ϕ;n) =
(w ,ri ;mi1, · · · ,mit ), wherew ∈ {[a],[b],ϕ} based on the value of i ,
r i are the i th party internal random numbers, andmij represents
the j th message that is received by i th party. Recall that party B
does not have any initial input, thus its inputs is denoted as ϕ.
output
EQT −1
i ([a],[b];ϕ;n) represents the output of each party in
EQT-1. To represent the joint output of both parties, we denote
output EQT −1 = (output EQT −11 ([a],[b];ϕ;n),
output
EQT −1
2 ([a],[b];ϕ;n)).
(2)
Definition 4.2. EQT-1 securely computes f = (Af ,Bf ) in the
semi-honest security setting if there exits PPT algorithms SimA
and SimB such that:
{(SimA(1n ,[a],[b],Af , f ))} c≡ {(view fA
([a],[b];ϕ;n),output f ([a],[b];ϕ;n))}
(3)
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and
{(SimB (1n ,ϕ,Bf , f ))} c≡ {(view fB
([a],[b];ϕ;n),output f ([a],[b];ϕ;n))}
(4)
Theorem 4.3. The protocol EQT-1 is simulation secure and se-
curely computes the functionality f , when the party A is corrupted
by adversary A in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
We need to show that party A cannot computationally distin-
guish between generated messages and outputs from S2 that is
the simulation of party B, and randomly generated data. Party A
receives an output from S2, [δB]. Given [a], [b], and 1n (security
parameter), party A works as follow:
(1) Party A chooses uniformly distributed random number r ,
δA, and ri , i ∈ {0, · · · , ℓ − 1} for Af .
(2) Party A executes Af1 to obtain [ci ], and sends them to S2.
(3) S2 tosses a random coin δ´B ∈ {0,1} and sends [δ´B] to party
A.
(4) Party A performs Af2 based on given [δ´B] to get [ϑ´ ].
The output of the simulation can be written as: SimA(1n , [a], [b],Af
, f ) = ([a],[b],r ,δA,ri ; [δ´B]; ([ϑ´ ],ϕ)). The real view of part A can
be presented as view fA([a],[b]) = ([a],[b],r ,δA,ri ; [δB]). And the
output of the real view is output f ([a],[b]) = ([ϑ ],ϕ). It can be
observed that the encryption pairs ([δ´B],[ϑ´ ]) and (δB ,[ϑ ]) are
computationally indistinguishable, since the crypto-scheme used
in EQT-1 is semantically secure. Therefore, we can claim that
SimA(1n ,[a],[b],Af , f )
c≡ {view fA([a],[b];ϕ),output f ([a],[b];ϕ)}.
(5)
Theorem 4.4. The protocol EQT-1 is simulation secure and se-
curely computes the functionality f , when the party B is corrupted
by adversary A in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
(1) S1 chooses ℓ uniformly distributed random integers c´i and
encrypts them, [c´i ].
(2) S1 tosses a random coin r1 ∈ {0,1}. If r1 = 1, then S1 chooses
a uniformly distributed random number r2 ∈ {0, · · · , ℓ − 1}
and sets [c´r2 ] ← [0].
(3) S1 sends [c´i ] to party B.
(4) Party B executes Bf1 and sends [δB] back to S1.
The simulation and the real view can be written as:
SimB (1n ,ϕ,Bf1 , f ) = (ϕ; [c´i ]; ([ϑ ],ϕ))
view
f
B ([a],[b],ϕ,n) = (ϕ; [ci ]; ([ϑ ].ϕ))
(6)
Since party A has the decryption key, we should show that A
cannot distinguish between c´i and ci . To do so, we analyze two
possible types of information leakage:
(1) Existence of zero in ci : in EQT-1, A cannot learn extra in-
formation if, for any i , ci = 0. The reason is that δA decides
whether ci = 0 means the equality or inequality of a and b,
and party B has no access to δA. Moreover, location i does
not leak any information, because party A permutes the ci
values before sending them to party B.
(2) Information about a and b if ci , 0: in case of ci , 0, party
B is still cannot learn any extra information, since the ci
values are multiplicatively masked in party A.
Therefore, A cannot distinguish between ci and c´i , which means:
SimB (1n ,ϕ,Bf1 , f ) = {view fB ([a],[b],ϕ,n),output f ([a],[b];ϕ)}
(7)
4.2 Security of EQT-2
Denoting computation of [x] as Af1 , ([X ], [xi ]) as Bf1 , [д] as Af2 ,
([дˆ], [ti ], [д.2− log2 ℓ]) as Bf2 , [ei ] as Af3 , [λˆ] as Bf3 , and [ϑ ] as
Af4 , we have Af = (Af1 ,Af2 ,Af3 ,Af4 ), Bf = (Bf1 ,Bf2 ,Bf3 ), and
f = (Af ,Bf ).
Theorem 4.5. The protocol EQT-2 is simulation secure and se-
curely computes the functionality f , when the party A is corrupted
by adversary A in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
(1) Party A chooses uniformly random numbers r , rˆ , s , and hi .
(2) Party A executes Af1 to obtain [x] and sends it to S2
(3) S2 generate ℓ random one-bit values xˆ and another random
integer Xˆ . S2 sends [xˆi ] and [Xˆ ] to party A.
(4) Party A calls Af2 to get [д] and sends it to S2.
(5) S2 generate three random numbers [д´], [tˆi ], and [д
′′] to party
A.
(6) Party A executes Af3 , computes [ei ], and sends [ei ] to S2.
(7) S2 tosses a random coin λˆ and sends it to party A.
(8) Party A executes Af4 to obtain [ϑ ].
Based on the same reason in Theorem 4.3, clearly, party A cannot
distinguish between ([xˆ], [Xˆ ], [д´], [tˆi ], [д
′′], [λ´]) and ([x], [X ], [д], [ti ], [д·
2− log2 ℓ],[λˆ]). Therefore,
SimA(1n ,[a],[b],Af , f )
c≡ {view fA([a],[b];ϕ),output f ([a],[b];ϕ)}.
(8)
Theorem 4.6. The protocol EQT-2 is simulation secure and se-
curely computes the functionality f , when the party B is corrupted
by adversary A in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Party A receives three outputs from S1 [x], [д], and [ei ]. Given
[1], [b], and 1n (security parameter), party A works as follow:
(1) S1 chooses a (κ + ℓ + 1)-bit random value xˆ , a random value
o ∈ {−ℓ, · · · , ℓ} and sends [xˆ] ← [xˆ + o] it to party B.
(2) Party B executes Ff1 and sends [xi ] and [X ] back to S1.
(3) S1 generates a (κ + log2 ℓ + 1)-bit random value д´ and sends
it to party B.
(4) Party B call Ff2 and sends [дˆ], [ti ], and [д · 2− log2 ℓ] to S1.
(5) S1 chooses i random number eˆi ∈ Z∗u , i ∈ {0, · · · , log2 ℓ − 1}.
Then, S1 tosses another coin δ , and if δ = 1, then chooses a
random i and eˆi = 0. Afterwards, S1 sends [eˆi ] to party B.
(6) Party B executes Bf3 to get λ´, and sends it to S1.
The simulation and the real view can be written as:
simB (1n ,ϕ,Bf , f ) = (ϕ; [xˆ],[д´],[eˆi ]; ([ϑ ,ϕ]))
view
f
B ([a],[b],ϕ,n) = (ϕ,[x],[д], [ei ]; ([ϑ ,ϕ]))
(9)
To provide simulation security, party B should not be able to distin-
guish between (xˆ ,д´, eˆi ) and (x ,д,ei ). Recall that party B has access
to the decryption key and can see the data in the clear. 1) party
A masks [a − b] with a large enough random value r to hide the
difference from party B. Thus,A cannot distinguish between x and
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xˆ . 2) [z] values are also additively masked with another random
number, which makes д´ and д indistinguishable for party B. 3) party
A also multiplicatively masks ci values which also makes eˆ indis-
tinguishable from e to party B. 4) party B cannot learn about the
relation between a and b be seeing a zero in one of the ei values,
since it is calculated based on random number s . Thus, if any of
ei = 0 then still party B does not know whether a = b or a , b.
Based on the four stated properties, we can claim that:
SimB (1n ,ϕ,Bf , f ) = web{view fB ([a],[b],ϕ,n),output f ([a],[b];ϕ)}
(10)
4.3 Security of EQT-3
Let us denote computation of [x] as Af1 , [xi ] and [X ] as Bf1 , [y] as
Af2 , [yi ] and [Y ] as Bf2 , computation of [z] as Af3 , [γ ] as Bf3 , and
computation of [ϑ ] as Af4 .
Theorem 4.7. The protocol EQT-3 is simulation secure and se-
curely computes the functionality f , when the party A is corrupted
by adversary A in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
S2 works as follow:
(1) Party A generate uniformly distributed random numbers r ,
w and s .
(2) Party A executes Af1 to obtain [x] and sends it to S2.
(3) S2 generate uniformly distributed random numbers [xˆi ] and
[Xˆ ], and sends them to party A.
(4) Party A calls Af2 and sends [yˆ] to S2.
(5) S2 generate random number [yˆi ] and [Yˆ ], and sends them
to party A.
(6) Party A performs Af3 to get [z] and sends it S2.
(7) S2 chooses a random number γˆ and sends [γˆ ] to party A.
(8) Party A executes Af4 to obtain [ϑ ].
Because of semantical security of the crypto-schemes used in this
work, A cannot distinguish between ([xˆi ],[Xˆ ],[yˆi ],[Yˆ ],[γˆ ]) and
([xi ],[X ],[yi ],[Y ],[γ ]). Thus, we can claim that
SimA(1n ,[a],[b],Af , f )
c≡ {view fA([a],[b];ϕ),output f ([a],[b];ϕ)}.
(11)
Theorem 4.8. The protocol EQT-3 is simulation secure and se-
curely computes the functionality f , when the party A is corrupted
by adversary B in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
S1 works as follow:
(1) S1 chooses a random number [xˆ].
(2) Party B receives [xˆ], decrypts it, executes Bf1 to obtain xi
and X , and sends them to S1 in encryption form.
(3) S1 generates random number yˆ and sends [yˆ] to party B.
(4) Party B executes Bf2 and sends [yi ] and [Y ] back to S1.
(5) S1 chooses a random number zˆ and sends [zˆ] to party B.
(6) Party B calls Bf3 to get γ and sends it to S1 in encryption
form.
Recall that party B is keeping the private key and is able to
decrypts the encryption given from party A. Thus, we need to
show A cannot learn any private information by distinguishing
given messages. First, party B cannot distinguish between xˆ and
x , since x is additively masked with a κ + ℓ + 1-bit value. Second,
distinguishing between yˆ and y is not computationally possible for
party B, since y is additively masked with large enough random
value. Similarly, party B cannot distinguish between zˆ and z, since
z value is additively masked. Therefore, we can conclude that
SimB (1n ,ϕ,Bf , f ) = {view fB ([a],[b],ϕ,n),output f ([a],[b];ϕ)}
(12)
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
5.1 Complexity Analysis
Communication. Table 2 presents the number of communica-
tion rounds and the amount of data transmitted. Table 2 shows
that, except ST06 and NO07, they are all constant-round protocols.
ST06 uses bit decomposition, which results in more number of
communication rounds.
Table 2: Number of communication rounds and amount of
data transmission (ℓ = 20,φ = 12,u = 31).
Protocols Rounds Transmitted data (KB)
[LT13] 2 2 ℓ + 1 21
[ST06] 2ℓ+2⌈log2 ℓ⌉+2 52 (6ℓ − 5)/2 57.5
[NO07] 3φ 36 (2φ + ⌈log2 φ⌉ + 1)/2 14.5
EQT-1 2 2 (ℓ + 2)/2 1 1
EQT-2 3 3 (ℓ + ⌈log2 ℓ⌉)/2 + 2 14.5
EQT-3 3 3 (ℓ + 3⌈log2 ℓ⌉ + 6)/2 20
According to Table 2, using EQT-1 requires the least data trans-
mission among the other protocols, which is mainly due to the
use of DGK encryption scheme. In contrast, EQT-3 is the least
communication-wise efficient protocol because of the large cipher-
text space of Paillier and transmission of the Lagrange polynomial
coefficients.
Computation. Table 3 presents the overall computational cost
given in the number of modular multiplications. The cost of the
DGK zero-check function can be represented as 3t/4 multiplica-
tions modulo n [10] and we can show the complexity of a ciphertext
modulo n with an x-bit exponent as 3x/2 multiplications modulo n.
According to Table 3, LT13 is the most computation-wise expen-
sive protocol because of having ℓ exponentiations with (2κ)i bits
exponents, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. There are also (6ℓ)−1 exponentiations in
ST06, but the exponents are −1. From the Table 3, we can see that
EQT-3 has the least number of multiplication among the others.
The main reason for having this outstanding efficiency in EQT-3
is performing less expensive exponentiations. In EQT-3, there are
(2⌈log2 ℓ⌉) exponentiations with ⌈log2 ℓ⌉/2-bit exponents.
Table 4 presents the numbers of encryption and decryption.
According to Table 4, ST06 and NO07 require a higher number of
decryption to be performed compared to the other protocols. Since
Paillier decryption is an expensive operation, a large number of
decryption in a protocol is not desirable.
Our proposed protocols show different performances regarding
communication and computation. For a system with limited com-
munication resources, EQT-1 is a suitable choice, since it has only
two communication rounds and the lowest data transmission cost.
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Table 3: Overall computational cost and the complexity (ℓ =
20).
Protocols Multiplication Complexity
[LT13] ℓ(768(ℓ + 1) + 7/2) + 3079 331169 O (ℓ2)
[ST06] 45ℓ + ℓ/2 − 1 902 O (ℓ)
[NO07] (3ℓ⌈log2 ℓ!⌉)/2+ℓ+20672 22522 O (ℓ log2 ℓ!)
EQT-1 504ℓ + ℓ/2 + 345 10435 O (ℓ)
EQT-2 ℓ/2 + 841⌈log2 ℓ⌉ + 25 4240 O (ℓ)
EQT-3 ℓ/2 + 3/2(⌈log2 ℓ⌉)2 +
5/2⌈log2 ℓ⌉ + 14
74 O (ℓ)
Table 4: Number of encryption and decryption per protocol
(ℓ = 20,φ = 12,u = 31).
Protocols Encryption Decryption
[LT13] 2ℓ + 1 41 2 2
[ST06] 5ℓ 100 3ℓ − 1 59
[NO07] ℓ + 2φ + 1 45 2φ + 1 25
EQT-1 2ℓ + 2 42 1 1
EQT-2 ℓ + 2⌈log2 ℓ⌉ + 5 35 2 2
EQT-3 ℓ + 3⌈log2 ℓ⌉ + 8 43 3 3
Although EQT-1 has a very low communication cost, its computa-
tional cost is twice more than EQT-2 and hundred times more than
EQT-3. For a system with very limited computational resources,
EQT-3 is a good choice, since it has significantly low computational
cost. However, EQT-3’s data transmission cost is twice more than
EQT-1 and also higher than EQT-2.
5.2 Experimental Results
The protocols are implemented using C++ and external libraries:
MPIR, Boost, and SeComLib on a single Linux machine running
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, with a 64-bit microprocessor and 8 GB of RAM,
ignoring network latency. The cryptographic key lengths of the
Paillier and DGK cryptosystems are chosen according to NIST stan-
dards [2], which are valid until 2030. Table 5 shows the parameters
used for the implementation.
Table 5: Parameters used in the implementation.
Parameter Symbol Value
Bit size of inputs ℓ 2-30
Security parameter κ 112 bits
Paillier message space n 2048 bits
DGK message space u 31
DGK security parameter t 224 bits
Error controller in NO07 φ 12
As [23] does not provide an analysis on φ, we implemented and
analyzed their proposal. Figure 2 shows various values of φ with
their corresponding error rates. Furthermore, it presents run-time of
the NO07 equality testing protocol with 25-bit inputs, and different
φ values. As it is shown in Figure 2, choosing φ = 12 makes the
error probability negligible.
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Figure 2: The error-rates and run-times ofNO07 for different
values of φ.
Figure 3 shows the run-times of all the described secure equality
testing protocols. Since VAT09, LT13, ST06, and NO07 are much
more expensive regarding run-time than our protocols; we present
their run-times separately in Figure 3b. As it is shown in Figure 3a,
EQT-1 has the lowest run-time for inputs smaller than 20 bits.
Figure 3b shows the proposed protocols are computationally much
more efficient than the state-of-the-art, as they outperform NO07,
ST06, VAT09, and LT13 by 95%, 96%, 97%, and 99%, respectively for
25-bit inputs.
Notice that Figure 3a shows the total run-time, which involves
run-times of all operations including encryption and decryption.
However, Table 3 only presents the complexities of multiplication,
exponentiation, and DGK zero-check, and it does not take into
account the encryption and decryption costs.
5.3 Applying data packing
We observed that Paillier decryption dominates a significant portion
of the total run-times of the protocols. For instance, it is shown
in Table 3 that EQT-3 is the most efficient protocol. However, in
Figure 3a, EQT-3 does not demonstrate the same efficiency due to
the cost of Paillier decryption. Data packing [29] can be used to
mitigate such effect of Paillier decryption cost. Data packing reduces
decryption cost since multiple messages packed in one ciphertext
can be decrypted at once. However, data packing is applicable in the
cases where there are multiple equality tests to be performed. This
condition is realistic since in existing applications such as search
algorithms many equality tests are needed. Since data packing uses
the plaintext space of the encryption scheme, Paillier, efficiently, it
also reduces the communication cost. Figure 4 shows that the run-
time and total data transmission of our equality testing protocols
are reduced significantly after applying data packing. Notice that
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Figure 3: Run-times of the equality testing protocols without data packing.
the results in Figure 4a are matching our analysis in Table 3, which
does not take encryption and decryption into account. According
to Figure 4a, EQT-3 after data packing outperforms VAT09, LT13,
ST06, and NO07 by 99% for the inputs larger than 20 bits.
Table 6 compares performance of the protocol based on run-
time, communicational round, and total data transmission for the
inputs size of 20 bits. Table 6 clearly shows the trade-off between
communication and computation costs in all protocols.
Table 6: Comparing EQT’s performances (ℓ = 20,φ = 12,u =
31).
Protocols Run-time (sec) Rounds Data transmission (KB)
EQT-1 0.008 2 10
EQT-2 0.0048 3 13
EQT-3 0.0033 3 19
6 CONCLUSIONS
Testing equality of encrypted values is a building block in a number
of cryptographic protocols such as searching in encrypted databases.
In this work, we have investigated the state-of-the-art protocols and
propose three new cryptographic protocols, which are significantly
more efficient than the existing work regarding communication and
computation. However, each protocol presented in this paper has
its own advantages and disadvantages on run-time, bandwidth, and
the number of rounds. Nevertheless, our analysis and experimental
results support our claims in terms of efficiency compared to the
state-of-the-art.
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Figure 4: Run-time and data transmission of the equality testing protocols after data packing.
Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 17-21, 2003, Proceedings. 247–264. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_15
[12] Oded Goldreich. 2004. The Foundations of Cryptography - Volume 2, Basic Appli-
cations. Cambridge University Press.
[13] Carmit Hazay and Tomas Toft. 2014. Computationally Secure Pattern Matching
in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries. J. Cryptology 27, 2 (2014), 358–395.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-013-9147-8
[14] Kaibin Huang, Raylin Tso, and Yu-Chi Chen. 2017. Somewhat semantic secure
public key encryption with filtered-equality-test in the standard model and its
extension to searchable encryption. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 89 (2017), 400–409.
[15] Arjan Jeckmans, Andreas Peter, and Pieter Hartel. 2013. Efficient privacy-
enhanced familiarity-based recommender system. In Computer Security–ESORICS
2013. Springer, 400–417.
[16] Vladimir Kolesnikov, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Thomas Schneider. 2009. Im-
proved Garbled Circuit Building Blocks and Applications to Auctions and Com-
puting Minima. In Cryptology and Network Security, 8th International Conference,
CANS 2009, Kanazawa, Japan, December 12-14, 2009. Proceedings. 1–20. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_1
[17] Vladimir Kolesnikov and Thomas Schneider. 2008. Improved Garbled Circuit:
Free XOR Gates and Applications. In Automata, Languages and Programming,
35th International Colloquium, ICALP 2008, Reykjavik, Iceland, July 7-11, 2008,
Proceedings, Part II - Track B: Logic, Semantics, and Theory of Programming &
Track C: Security and Cryptography Foundations. 486–498. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-540-70583-3_40
[18] Hyung Tae Lee, San Ling, Jae Hong Seo, and Huaxiong Wang. 2016. Semi-
generic construction of public key encryption and identity-based encryption
with equality test. Inf. Sci. 373 (2016), 419–440.
[19] Chen Li, Rongxing Lu, Hui Li, Le Chen, and Jie Chen. 2015. PDA: a privacy-
preserving dual-functional aggregation scheme for smart grid communications.
Security and Communication Networks 8, 15 (2015), 2494–2506.
[20] Yehuda Lindell. 2017. How to Simulate It - A Tutorial on the Simulation Proof
Technique. In Tutorials on the Foundations of Cryptography. 277–346.
[21] Helger Lipmaa and Tomas Toft. 2013. Secure Equality and Greater-Than Tests
with Sublinear Online Complexity. In Automata, Languages, and Programming -
40th International Colloquium, ICALP 2013, Riga, Latvia, July 8-12, 2013, Proceed-
ings, Part II. 645–656. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39212-2_56
[22] Majid Nateghizad, Zekeriya Erkin, and Reginald L Lagendijk. 2016. An efficient
privacy-preserving comparison protocol in smart metering systems. EURASIP
Journal on Information Security 2016, 1 (2016), 1–8.
[23] Takashi Nishide and Kazuo Ohta. 2007. Multiparty computation for interval,
equality, and comparison without bit-decomposition protocol. In Public Key
Cryptography–PKC 2007. Springer, 343–360.
[24] Pascal Paillier. 1999. Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree
Residuosity Classes. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT ’99, International
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Prague,
Czech Republic, May 2-6, 1999, Proceeding. 223–238. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/3-540-48910-X_16
[25] Pascal Paillier. 1999. Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree
Residuosity Classes. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT ’99, International
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Prague,
Czech Republic, May 2-6, 1999, Proceeding. 223–238. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/3-540-48910-X_16
[26] Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Thomas Schneider, and Immo Wehrenberg. 2009. Efficient
Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition. In Information, Security and Cryptology -
ICISC 2009, 12th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, December 2-4, 2009, Revised
Selected Papers. 229–244. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14423-3_16
[27] Berry Schoenmakers and Pim Tuyls. 2006. Efficient Binary Conversion for
Paillier Encrypted Values. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006, 25th
Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28 - June 1, 2006, Proceedings. 522–537.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11761679_31
[28] Qiang Tang. 2012. Public key encryption supporting plaintext equality test and
user-specified authorization. Security and Communication Networks 5, 12 (2012),
1351–1362.
[29] Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Mehmet Celik, and Aweke
Lemma. 2007. A secure multidimensional point inclusion protocol. In Proceedings
of the 9th workshop on Multimedia & security. ACM, 109–120.
[30] Libing Wu, Yubo Zhang, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, and Debiao He. 2017.
Efficient and secure identity-based encryption scheme with equality test in cloud
computing. Future Generation Comp. Syst. 73 (2017), 22–31.
[31] Guomin Yang, Chik How Tan, Qiong Huang, and Duncan S. Wong. 2010. Proba-
bilistic Public Key Encryption with Equality Test. In Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA
2010, The Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference 2010, San Francisco, CA,
USA, March 1-5, 2010. Proceedings. 119–131.
[32] Zhiqiang Yang, Sheng Zhong, and Rebecca N. Wright. 2005. Privacy-Preserving
Classification of Customer Data without Loss of Accuracy. In Proceedings of the
2005 SIAM International Conference on Data Mining, SDM 2005, Newport Beach, CA,
USA, April 21-23, 2005. 92–102. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611972757.9
Page 10 of 10
